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abstract: This contribution articulates the synergies and divergences of the 
various formats of cooperation between China and the European 
countries. The EU and China have a strong interest in each other’s 
flagship initiatives, namely the Investment Plan for Europe, and 
the One Belt, One Road Initiative (Silk Road Economic Belt and 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road). The authors argue that there 
are certain synergies between these initiatives. Furthermore, the 
new initiative EU–China Connectivity Platform is aimed to explore 
these synergies. The authors explore the recent developments in the 
EU–China investments, trade cooperation and the challenges of 
the ever-growing CEEC–China partnership in different formats, 
including the new platform of 16+1. The authors examine these 
implications in relation to the need to expand and adapt the content 
and approach of the EU–China Bilateral Investment agreement. The 
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article concludes that the CEEC–China relation does not go against 
the EU; moreover, neither the CEE countries nor China have any 
motivation to try to weaken the EU. 
Keywords: Bilateral investment agreement, CEEC economic integration, EU, 
trade and investment
1. introduction
Historically, EU–China relations have focused to a large extent on trade in 
goods, and recently trade in services has also been growing rapidly. Trade in 
services is a relatively new development as compared with trade in goods. 
Contemporary EU–China initiatives and new cooperation formats have taken 
place in a difficult geo-economic situation and climate shaped by the impact of 
the economic crisis, Brexit and the US elections will have further repercussions 
to the EU–China relations also in the light of uncertainties regarding the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). This could subsequently lead to a further increase of China’s 
role in the global arena—including trade and investments. 
The field of investments is still seen as holding a vast untapped potential for 
European and Chinese economies. The article explores the recent developments 
in the EU–China investments and trade cooperation and the challenges of the 
ever-growing CEEC–China partnership in different formats, including the new 
platform of 16+1. While this new platform is still a ‘work in progress’, it has 
attracted increasing attention for supposedly affecting the united stance of the 
EU in the conduct of its foreign policy. In this article the rationale of each 
of the three sides—China, the EU and, more specifically, Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC)—will be analysed. It is argued that there is nothing 
substantive in this relation which would go against the EU; moreover, neither 
the CEE countries nor China have any motivation to try to weaken the EU. The 
article also articulates the synergies and divergences of the various formats of 
cooperation between China and the European countries.  
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2. Eu–china trade and investments
The EU and China are two of the biggest traders in the world. China is now the 
EU’s second trading partner behind the United States, and the EU is China’s 
main trading partner. EU–China trade has increased dramatically in recent 
years; for most trade items they are increasingly competitive (Fig. 1).
Figure 1. Development of EU exports and imports of goods with China, 2005–2015 
(billion euros)
Source: Eurostat, 2016
China and Europe now trade well over 1 billion euros a day (EC DG Trade, 
2016). The EU imports from China are dominated by industrial and consumer 
goods: machinery and equipment, footwear and clothing, furniture, and toys. 
EU exports to China are concentrated on machinery and equipment, motor 
vehicles, aircraft, and chemicals.  According to the DG Trade of the European 
Commission (EC, 2016), the year 2015 has been marked by record trade deficit 
in goods worth of 180 billion euros, but record surplus in services (Fig. 2). 
The EU is committed to widen trading relations with China. However, the EU 
wants to ensure that China trades fairly, respects intellectual property rights and 
meets its WTO obligations.
The 2008 financial crisis in Europe, and the subsequent (and still ongoing) debt 
crisis which hit the continent in 2010, has caused European investors to hold 
on tightly to their wallets. Europe today does not have a cash problem; it has a 
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liquidity problem. Businesses lack the confidence to spend the money they have. 
On the other side of the world, China is flush with cash from its economic boom. 
Chinese investors have stepped into the European investment void, buying 
properties, industries and financial assets (Fig. 3). China’s outbound foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) has grown exponentially in recent years and hit a new 
record high of 20 billion euros in 2015, illustrating China’s potential to become 
an important source of capital for Europe.
The ‘Big 3’includes France, Germany and the UK; ‘Benelux’ includes Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg; ‘Eastern Europe’ includes Austria, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia; ‘Southern Europe’ 
includes Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain; 
‘Northern Europe’ includes Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Latvia and 
Sweden.
Investment flows show vast untapped potential, especially when taking into 
account the size of the respective economies. China accounts for just 2–3% of 
overall European investments abroad, whereas Chinese investments in Europe 
are rising, but from an even lower base while investments from the EU in China 
amount to a mere 5% of European investments abroad and only a fraction of 
the overall trade volume. In turn, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China 
represents less than 3% of the total FDI inflow into the EU (Hanemann & 
Huotari, 2016). At the same time, the competition among EU states for Chinese 
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capital has intensified, which weakens European leverage vis-à-vis China on 
important strategic questions. Moreover, investment patterns in 2015 further 
aggravate the existing economic concerns related to Chinese investment, most 
importantly the lack of equal market access for European companies in China 
and potential market distortions through state-owned and state-supported 
enterprises. Addressing those concerns now is critical as China expects to 
deploy an additional 1 trillion US dollars in OFDI in the coming five years in 
Europe and globally (Mission of China to the EU, 2016). Chinese investors have 
broadly followed the footsteps of other foreign investors in Europe by putting 
most of their investments in the wealthiest and largest European economies. The 
‘Big Three’ (Germany, the UK, and France) have received a relatively constant 
figure of 4–8 billion euros over the last five years and they continued to be 
major targets in 2015. The big story of the past two years, however, is the sharp 
increase of Chinese OFDI in other parts of Europe. In 2015, Southern European 
economies accounted for almost half of all Chinese EU investment for the first 
time. High-profile ‘flagship deals’ (ChemChina’s acquisition of Pirelli, Wanda’s 
investment in Atletico Madrid, and Haitong’s acquisition of Banco Espirito 
Santo’s investment banking business) have put China in the role of a significant 
investor in those economies, amid otherwise sluggish FDI inflows. Investments 
Figure 3. Chinese OFDI in the EU-28 by country group 2000–2015 (million euros)
Source: Rhodium Group, 2016
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in the Benelux countries also increased markedly in the past two years and 
pending projects could further boost Chinese presence in Eastern Europe if 
they materialise (Mission of China to the EU, 2016). The broader geographic 
dispersion of Chinese OFDI across Europe has increased competition between 
EU states for Chinese investment (Fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Chinese FDI in the EU-28 in 2000–2015 (million euros)
Source: Rhodium Group, 2016
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In 2015, virtually every EU Member State (MS) has sought high-level exchanges 
with China to strengthen bilateral investment and China is increasingly able to 
use the promise of capital as a carrot for other foreign policy goals. Greater 
capital flows, for example, remain the core driver of the rapidly evolving ‘16+1’ 
relationship between China and Central and Eastern European economies. 
Another example is the UK, where a flurry of high-profile investments has 
contributed to a visible shift in the UK’s China policy. This race for Chinese 
investment is also contributing to a division between European economies over 
important economic policy decisions, most recently whether the EU should 
grant China Market Economy Status or if the EU should enter negotiations over 
a potential free trade agreement with China.
In addition to the anticipated economic gains from increased investments within 
various formats, European policymakers and businesses alike have placed high 
hopes in the conclusion of the bilateral investment agreement (BIA). In January 
2016, representatives of the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce met in Beijing for the ninth round of negotiations over the BIA 
between the EU and China. Negotiations over the BIA were initiated after the 
eurozone crisis erupted in 2008. The need for liquidity in European countries 
served as an impetus to enhance the possibilities of acquiring investments from 
outside Europe, while China pursues secure and predictable environments for its 
investments. The EU–China BIA is one of the priorities of the EU’s new trade 
and investment strategy ‘Trade for All’ (Ewert, 2016), as a means to deepen 
relations with China. According to optimistic estimates, the negotiations could 
be concluded in 2017.
3. flagship initiatives to foster Eu–china investment cooperation 
The EU and China have a strong interest in each other’s flagship initiatives, 
namely the Investment Plan for Europe, and the Belt and Road initiative (Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road). We argue that there 
are certain synergies between these initiatives (Fig. 5). 
Furthermore, the new initiative EU–China Connectivity Platform is aimed to 
explore these synergies.
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Figure 5. The EU–China cooperation: when geopolitical meets geoeconomics
Source: European Economic and Social Committee, 2016
3.1 investment plan for Europe
The idea behind the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is that 
the public money will unlock the money from hesitant private investors in 
Europe and beyond. One could argue that the Chinese are more inclined to find 
Europe an attractive investment than are European investors. Chinese Premier 
Li Keqiang announced at the EU–China summit that China stands ready to dock 
with the EU’s investment plan and make infrastructure investments (Mission 
of China to the EU, 2016). Specific figure on China’s investment intentions 
has not been mentioned, although media reports have speculated that Beijing 
could invest between 5 and 10 billion euros in the EFSI, the EU’s guarantee 
scheme to back risky projects in the EU. EU officials and Chinese authorities 
are examining what instruments could be used to channel the investment. The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) has set up a working group with the task to 
identify concrete modalities for joint EU-China cooperation on the Investment 
Plan for Europe. The group, which includes experts from China’s Silk Road 
Fund, the Commission, and the EIB, will explore areas and opportunities for 
co-financing and participation from the Chinese side (Valero, 2016). 
China’s investment in the EU has sparked controversy in the past. In Greece, 
Chinese company COSCO was blamed for paying a fraction of European salaries 
and for not respecting European rights, according to the longshoreman’s union 
(Valero, 2016). Elsewhere, Chinese labourers have been brought in to work on 
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massive infrastructure projects, calling into question whether its involvement 
would create additional jobs for Europeans, as the investment plan aims to do.
The UK obtained financial support from China to construct a nuclear plant in 
Hinkley. In return for a 2 billion pounds loan guarantee, the UK will allow 
Chinese companies to build an additional nuclear plant in Bradwell, Essex.
The GMB union, which represents nuclear workers, said linking that deal to a 
reactor at Bradwell would be a “betrayal” of British workers. Brian Strutton, 
GMB National Secretary for Energy, said that “Chinese nuclear technology is 
unproven, and no UK government should even consider allowing it to be used 
in a new nuclear power station 60 miles from London” (Valero, 2016).
However, referring to Fraser Cameron, director of the EU-Asia centre in 
Brussels, China’s contribution to the new investment fund represents a “win-
win situation” for both partners (Valero, 2016). While Beijing wants to bolster 
its soft power in Europe, and gain European support on issues such as the reform 
of the IMF and the World Bank, China is also looking for large-scale projects 
to invest in that represent good business opportunities, in particular, high-speed 
trains and nuclear power plants.
3.2 china’s Belt and road initiative
The figures speak for themselves—55% of the world’s GDP, 70% of the world’s 
population and 75% of energy resources are concentrated in the region covered 
by the OBOR initiative. With a planned overall financial commitment of around 
1,400 billion euros, the strategic objective of this initiative is to reinforce China’s 
role in global relations and step up its economic and trade relationships with the 
65 countries also involved through transport and logistics infrastructure projects 
(Palmieri & Celi, 2016).
The Juncker Plan and China’s Belt and Road initiative are symmetrical. This 
strategy, which was unveiled in 2013, is focused on connecting the countries 
of Eurasia and the wider world through improved infrastructure networks, 
investment projects and cultural exchanges. The initiative has a land and a 
sea component, known respectively as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road. Unlike the original Silk Road, however, the 
new project is not predominantly about transportation infrastructure but about 
economic integration. It attempts to create a set of political and institutional 
tools with which China can start to reorganise global value chains and stamp its 
imprint on the rules governing the global economy.
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The initiative is aimed at encouraging the countries along the Belt and Road to 
achieve economic policy coordination and carry out broader and more in-depth 
regional cooperation, and jointly create an open, inclusive and balanced regional 
economic cooperation architecture. In June 2015, China and Hungary signed a 
memorandum of understanding on further cooperation under the framework of 
the Belt and Road initiative. It is the first initiative document China has signed 
with a European country. China will work together with Hungary to step up the 
modernisation of the Budapest–Belgrade railroad, the construction of a China-
Europe land-sea express line and completion of other major infrastructure 
projects (Gambrella, 2016). Both the Belt and Road initiative and the Juncker 
Plan will be primarily focused on infrastructure and cross-border connections. 
The plan is for ‘Silk Road’ infrastructure projects to extend all the way to 
Budapest, where they could link up with EU infrastructure projects funded by 
the Juncker Plan.
Figure 6. The Belt and Road Initiative map
Source: Xinhua, 2015
The interest of Chinese businesses in investing in the European market is 
currently intense. Last year non-financial foreign direct investment from China 
to the EU was almost 10 billion dollars, exceeding FDI from the EU to China for 
the first time (Macaes, 2016). It is not just the lack of intra-European investment 
that is attracting Chinese businesses. Europe’s regulatory environment also 
makes it an attractive destination. 
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3.3 Eu–china connectivity platform
The willingness of the EU and China to explore synergy between the two 
development strategies lead to establishing the EU–China Connectivity Platform 
as a vehicle to connect the Eurasian continent through a physical and digital 
network. The network would enable the flow of trade, investment and people-
to-people contact (Turcsányi, 2014). According to the EU strategy, cooperation 
on digital economy should harness growth through open markets, common 
standards and joint research on the basis of reciprocity in areas such as 5G 
mobile communications and the internet of things (EC, 2015).   
With the EU’s know-how and mature legislation system, and China’s huge 
market needs and fast-moving innovation on advanced technology, the EU and 
China are natural partners, The Connectivity Platform would provide visibility 
on investment opportunities along the Silk Road to interested investors and 
other parties, as well as to provide a level playing field for investors and relevant 
business on both sides. Some of these projects might be suitable for financing 
by EU resources (including EFSI) and/or Chinese funds (such as Silk Road 
Fund). The EIB would contribute to the work of the Platform so as to explore 
opportunities for co-financing infrastructure links between the EU and China, 
in the framework of EIB external mandates. 
The EU wants a China that is economically more open and stable, with 
significantly improved market access for foreign companies. A company like 
Alibaba could play a key role in this process by providing the EU companies—
and in particular small and medium-sized enterprises—a platform to reach 
Chinese undertakings and consumers. In this context, deepening cooperation 
on customs and trade facilitation would be appropriate to boost e-commerce 
between the EU and China. At the same time, the EU establishes a common 
minimum definition of what constitutes critical national infrastructure in the 
context of inward investment, to provide legal certainty and promote investment, 
something it has done, for example, with the countries of Eastern Partnership 
(Kerikmäe & Chochia, 2016). 
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3.4 investment banking for infrastructure building and strategic 
development in asia
The new international development bank was launched in early 2016. Although 
it is seen as a rival to the US-led World Bank, many countries have agreed to 
join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in recognition of China’s 
growing economic clout. So far 13 EU Member States (Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, UK) have joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which is 
considerable participation, at the same time indicating that not all EU Member 
States have the same stance on the issue of joining the AIIB. The prospects for 
other EU Member States to join are not clear and depend very much on countries 
themselves. It seems that Beijing seeks to change the unwritten rules of global 
development finance. The AIIB is expected to lend 10 to 15 billion dollars a 
year for the first five or six years and has started its operations in the second 
quarter of 2016 (Palmieri & Celi, 2016). The opening of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) is part of China’s vision of strategic development, 
which aims to achieve the “two centenary goals”. 
For China, the new bank is fundamental for reinforcing its international position 
outside the Post Bretton Woods System. The initiative is intended to support 
the introduction of a multipolar financial and currency system able to offer 
alternative solutions to the monopoly of the dollar.
Unlike other, similar initiatives, such as the New Development Bank (NDB), 
which was set up by the BRICS, China has asked other countries to be founding 
members of the AIIB without any prerequisites. While for Asian countries this 
provides an opportunity to take actively part in the decision-making process on 
investments which will reduce their infrastructure deficit, for European countries 
joining the AIIB is seen as an opportunity to tap into the major infrastructure 
market which will be developing in Asia in the coming years by winning tenders 
and subcontracting contracts for their own companies.
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4. framework 16+1: developments and prospects
4.1 new opportunity
Despite the large volume of trade, mutual direct investment is still relatively 
low, according to the European Community with just over 2% of EU FDI in 
China (EC, 2016).
For years, European companies sought to benefit from cheap labour by building 
factories in China, but today that trend is reversing. Chinese investors are now 
eyeing Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, where the eurozone crisis has 
pushed labour costs down and created hunger for foreign investment.
The CEE EU countries are not at the forefront of EU relations with third countries. 
Since the fall of the communist regimes their foreign policies have been almost 
predominantly oriented towards the EU. Now these countries are interested in 
developing relations with China in the CEEC–China 16+1 cooperation format, 
which raises issues in relation to the EU common foreign trade policy. CEEC–
China 16+1 cooperation format is driven by trade promotion and investment, 
thus serving as a basis for enhancing the bilateral cooperation between China and 
CEEC, which the Chinese media describe as a “golden opportunity”. The format 
has included a wide range of activities and in such sectors as cooperation and 
connectivity, economic and financial issues, agriculture and forestry, science, 
technology and health, people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges, 
cooperation at the local governmental level (LIIA, 2016). 
The format, which held its first summit in 2012 in Warsaw, Poland, brought 
together leaders from China and 16 CEEC: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
The situation of bilateral cooperation between China and CEEC is rather 
diverse with very different levels of progress and engagement achieved. But the 
questions remain: where there is this “golden opportunity” and whether there 
are any risks when it comes to the synergies between the EU–China relations 
and the 16+1 cooperation? Since the opening up of the 16+1 platform, relations 
between China and the CEEC have been increasingly attracting attention around 
Europe, for supposedly affecting the united position of the EU, which is against 
the EU good practices to develop a separate institutionalised relation with a third 
state. The rationale for this relatively new relationship should be seen from three 
perspectives—China as the initiator of the platform; the involved CEEC as the 
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main beneficiaries; and the EU as the ‘mother’ unit partly encompassing the 
CEE region. Scholars argue (Turcsányi, 2014) that statements about a dividing 
line are improper and these accusations are based largely on false presumptions 
or potential future problems. On the other hand, the approach of the Western 
European countries may in fact point to the EU’s internal problems. China 
is exploring new ways to expand its exports, looking for secure and reliable 
channels and hopes that building up better relations with the CEEC, most of 
whom are also EU MS, can help push forward its overall relations with the EU. 
In this context, the 16+1 format represents for China its complimentary “bridge 
to Europe”. The CEE region is becoming a distinct link within China’s new Silk 
Road, which will more directly connect East Asia to Europe. Logistically CEEC 
will play a crucial role in making sure China’s Silk Road Economic Belt reaches 
its final destination—Western Europe. 
4.2 achievements to date
The format has made CEE important in terms of Chinese foreign policy. Since 
the summits in Belgrade and Riga, the role of the Balkans and Baltic states in 
Chinese policy towards Europe has increased. Miscellaneous meetings under 
the 16+1 format contributed to the intensification of political dialogue on the 
lower level (for example, that of ministers and local authorities) and people-
to-people exchanges. Moreover, the status of Central Europe within the region 
and in the EU has been raised. The CEE countries showed that they are able 
to establish their own formula for cooperation with China, and to pursue an 
active policy towards non-European great powers. Another result is the rise 
of interest of potential investors in countries, which hosted the 16+1 summits. 
For example, Serbia and Romania recorded increased interest from potential 
investors, not only from China but also from Korea and Japan. As far as 
economic cooperation is concerned, discrepancies between EU and non-EU 
members are noticeable, especially in terms of investments and infrastructural 
projects. They are located mainly in the non-EU countries, which indicate the 
weakness of Chinese financial instruments that are not adapted to the needs 
of all countries. The Chinese credit line is being used, for example, in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for the construction of a thermal power plant in Stanari, in 
Macedonia for building highways, and in Serbia for a Belgrade bypass. Credit 
from China-based Exim Bank is being used to build a new thermal power plant 
unit in Kostolac. Similar credit was also utilised to build a bridge over the 
Danube in Belgrade, which was officially opened in 2014 (Szczudlik, 2016). 
In terms of failures to date, there has been little progress with the high-speed 
Belgrade-to-Budapest railway, a 16+1 flagship project. Many agreements have 
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The Riga Summit
 
The fifth CEEC–China 16+1 Summit took place in Riga on 4–6 
November 2016; although it is seen as a great achievement by 
Latvian hosts, there was an overall impression that it was very 
much Chinese-driven event. Both the Latvian PM Kučinskis and 
the Chinese PM Li Keqiang emphasised the importance of EU–
China cooperation and complementarity of the 16+1 format.  At 
the summit, China launched a 10 billion euro investment fund to 
finance projects in CEE (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Latvia, 2016); the fund is aiming to raise a total of 50 billion 
euros in project financing for sectors such as infrastructure, high-
tech manufacturing and consumer goods. While targeting the 
CEE region, it could extend to the rest of Europe and other areas, 
if relevant to China–CEE cooperation. It also has certain synergy 
with and well compliments the Investment Plan for Europe (Nikers, 
2016). 
The summit focussed on the logistics and development of new 
freight routes, symbolically, the first rail cars loaded with containers 
arrived in Riga from the Chinese city of Yiwu, carrying textiles, 
plumbing and household goods, the train travelled more than 11,000 
kilometres across Russia to Riga in 16 days (Yiwu–Zabaikalsk–
Riga). 
It is evident that China is becoming an increasingly important 
trading partner for all three of the Baltic States, as their access to 
and interest in the Russia market has gradually eroded. Moreover, 
the Baltics’ exports to China have been growing. Ten years ago, 
in 2006, Latvian exports to China accounted for only 10 million 
euros, while currently they have grown to more than 100 million 
euros (106.75 million US dollars). Latvian food exports to China, 
in particular, have found new niches thanks to the certification of a 
number of dairy and fish manufacturers. In addition, Latvian timber 
products, cosmetics and electrical equipment have also been making 
substantial inroads in China (Simurina, 2015).
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been signed but not implemented, and there are concerns that the 1.7 billion 
dollar line of credit extended by China may seriously increase Hungary’s 
national debt. Furthermore, the European Commission has initiated preliminary 
infringement proceedings against Hungary. This is because the project assumes 
implementation by a consortium from Hungary and China (15% and 85%, 
respectively) based on an intergovernmental agreement (Szczudlik, 2016), but 
not through issuing tender procedures. In Riga the decision was made that the 
consortium will announce a tender and sign agreements with contractors. This 
means that the consortium itself will not be a project contractor, although the 
financial aspects have not changed and 85% of the project (Szczudlik, 2016) 
was expected to be financed with Chinese credit. Still, the level of Chinese 
investments is modest, while the trade deficit on the CEE side is increasing. 
China has not yet located manufacturing bases in Central Europe, an idea that it 
announced at previous summits. At the same time Chinese firms are increasingly 
investing in CEEC. These investments are quite a new phenomenon and still 
constitute a small share of China’s total FDI in Europe (10%), but since 2006 
we have seen a growing influx of Chinese investments into the region, which is 
expected to increase further in the future (Fig. 7). 
Figure 7. China’s OFDI stock in Visegrad Countries, 2003–2012 (billion US dollars)
Source: CEIC, 2012; MOFCON 2013
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4.3 prospects
China and the European countries will not abandon the 16+1 format—a useful 
political instrument. One may expect an extension of the format, for example 
with other countries acting as observers. This assumption may be vindicated by 
the fact that China has recently been promoting the 16+1 as “open”. With more 
countries on board in the framework of 16+1, China may highlight its rising 
international status and attract more allies for its own interests. At one 16+1 
meeting in Ningbo, in June, Hungary openly declared support for granting China 
market economy status. It also supported China’s position on the South China 
Sea issue, just before a ruling by the Court of Arbitration, and afterwards, with 
Croatia, was reluctant to adopt the EU statement about this issue. The decision 
to hold the next 16+1 summit in Hungary might be perceived as appreciation 
for Viktor Orbán’s pro-Chinese policy. It is worth mentioning that the Czech 
Republic was also interested in hosting the next summit (Szczudlik, 2016). For 
China, the 16+1 remains a mechanism for gaining knowledge about the region, 
such as investment conditions and plans, important for the implementation of 
the Silk Road initiative.
The 16 countries will also use the format to indicate their own interests and 
strengthen bilateral relations with China. A good example is Latvia, which is 
greatly interested in transport in the northeastern part of Europe. Latvia sees 
opportunities for cooperation with China, following the deterioration of its 
relations with Russia after the imposition of sanctions that limited Russian 
trade in the ports of the Baltic States. The 16+1 format should serve as well 
for Poland (Szczudlik, 2016) as a complementary element for strengthening 
bilateral relations and the pursuit of Polish interests. 
5. concluding remarks
The analysis shows that there is high level of synergy between the EU–China 
and CEEC–China cooperation as both are based on the same objectives to boost 
trade and investment and to create jobs and growth. CEEC and China’s ever 
growing cooperation should rather be seen as complementary to the efforts that 
are taken on the EU–China level. In addition, there are no major risks that could 
go against the EU; moreover, neither the CEE countries nor China have any 
motivation to try to weaken the EU. 
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Chinese investments and trade cooperation and the challenges of evergrowing 
CEEC–China partnership in the different formats, including the new platform of 
16+1, are still a new platform a ‘work in progress’ and have attracted increasing 
attention for affecting the united position of the EU in its foreign policy. 
In the last decade, bilateral relations between the EU and China have become 
a real “strategic partnership” in the areas of trade cooperation, environmental 
protection, innovation, research, education and international security. In the 
coming years, cooperation will become even stronger and more challenging. 
If these challenges are to become opportunities using a win-win approach, they 
must be based on the “reciprocity” principle. 
While in China the framing and implementation of development policies is 
very much centrally coordinated, the EU is definitely weak when it comes to 
framing common political and economic strategies; in many cases, particularly 
regarding economic issues, the EU MS compete instead of cooperating, leaving 
individual enterprises to decide on strategies on how and where to invest. This 
dynamic could harm the economy of the majority of MS, particularly given 
that these challenges cannot be tackled effectively by individual national 
systems. 
The need to reinforce EU action on the “European dimension” of OBOR is clear 
from the fact that under the 16+1 mechanism (12 of the 16 are EU Member 
States), cooperation is already underway between China and the CEE countries. 
This process should be properly managed for this dynamic not to lead to tension, 
damaging European cohesion and relations between the EU, its MS and between 
the countries themselves.
The absence of a clear and coordinated EU position on the AIIB has not allowed 
for the planning and implementation of a common strategy, which would 
certainly have been useful for harnessing the EU’s interests to those of the 
individual MS. Given the pace of change and the considerable prospects for 
development of AIIB, the EU should support greater coordination at Member 
State level, partly with a view to shaping initiatives planned and implemented 
using a common approach which analyses all the abovementioned initiatives 
holistically.
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